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In February 1992, the leaders of the European Community (EC) met in
Maastricht, Holland, to sign a treaty of economic and monetary union.
European economic and monetary union (EMU), as set forth by the Delors Report
and formalized by the Maastricht treaty, is to be characterized by: a single
market typified by the “complete freedom of movement for persons, goods,
services and capital” (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetaxjy Union,
1989, para. 17); macroeconomic policy coordination among member governments; a
single currency; and, a common monetary policy carried out through a European
Central Bank (ECB). This single currency will be issued and controlled by the
central bank which is to be independent both from the national governments and
the European Community government. The central bank will be responsible for
the formulation and implementation of the monetary policy for the entire
Community (or members of the monetary union if these are less than the total
EC countries). As stated in the Maastricht Treaty, the primary objective of
the central bank will be price stability. To emphasize the weight the central
bank should place on achievement of this objective, the treaty states that
only without detriment to this objective should the central bank “support the
general economic policies in the Community” (Article 105.1). To further
emphasize the importance of price stability and the independence of the
central bank, the h ~ikis prohibited from directly financing government
deficits. ~2
While the member countries of the EC have agreed upon the basic
structure of the monetary union, there is less agreement as to the degree of
economic union that is necessary for monetary union -- in particular, the
coordination and control of fiscal policies. There are two views on the need
for fiscal coordination in a monetary union. The first argues that there is
no need to establish binding rules for fiscal policy, as the monetary union
will of itá lown accor4 lead tofiscal policy cônvérgence.~ Cohen (1989)
develops a model which supports this conclusion. He argues that monetary
policy coordination, if it is credible, will “trigger the appropriate fiscal
correction needed to make it sustainable” (Cohen, 1989, p. 304). Fiscal
policy coordination might be welfare enhancing, but he notes it is not a
prerequisite for monetary union. Click and Hutchinson (1992) argue that all
that may be necessary for the well functioning of a monetary union is that the
central bank be prohibited from financing government deficits.
The second view argues that binding rules with respect to the size of
government budget deficits are needed to ensure the proper functioning of a
monetary union. This view is based on the premise that there would be a lack
of fiscal restraint among the members of the monetary union which would crowd
out investment within the union due to an increase the interest rate.’ The
increase in the interest rate would also increase the cost of financing
deficits for all the member governments. Thus, countries that wanted to
control their debt to CDP ratios would have to tighten their fiscal
policies.2 This lack of fiscal restraint could also put pressure on the
1 Given the c~ istence of perfect capital mobility and if assets are perfect
substitutes, one ~an think of an interest rate prevailing for the entire EC.
2 See DeGrauwe (1992) for more on this point.3
monetary authority to ease policy. Those countries pursuing expansionary
policies might pressure the monetary authority to monetize their deficits,
while the other countries might also favor an expansionary monetary policy in
order to lower the interest rate. Fiscal laxity by some members could thus
create problems for the entire union either through higher inflation or slower
growth, which in turn could increase pressure within the fiscally sound
c~untries~o break ~ày fró~the ~on~tary union. I
Fiscal policy coordination, according to the Maastricht Treaty, will
take place through the establishment of “broad guidelines” to which the member
countries are to adhere. The Commission will report to the Council on the
economies of each member state and the consistency of each member’s policies
with the established guidelines. If the Commission believes that a country’s
policies are “not consistent with the broad guidelines ... or that they risk
jeopardizing the proper functioning of economic and monetary union,” it may
recommend that the Council suggest policy reforms to the errant country
(Article 103). The emphasis of the Treaty, however, is not on coordinating
policies, but restricting the ability of countries to pursue expansionary
fiscal policies. The Treaty set reference points for the size of government
deficits and the level of debt as percents of GDP. The Commission will
monitor the budget deficits and government debt of the member countries and
inform the Council of any country whose fiscal deficit rises above 3 percent
of its CDP or whose debt is greater than 60 percent of its CDP. The Council
may recommend corrective actions to be taken by the government(s) not meeting
one of these c’-~teria and can ultimately assess fines if these recommendations
are ignored. i~’thoughthis “excessive deficit” provision seems to place firm
restrictions on fiscal policies, the treaty does allow the Commission to take4
into account the other information “including the medium-term economic and
budgetary position” of the country in question before making its
recommendation to the Council. Furthermore if the increase in the deficit or
debt above the reference level is viewed as a temporary aberration it may be
tolerated.
As noted in Buiter and Kletzer (1991), the asymmetry of constraints
which is placed on fiscal policies, “can only be rationalized through a belief
that absent these constraints there would be a bias towards government
deficits that are too large rather than too small.” Furthermore, while fiscal
policy restrictions may be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of a
monetary union, restricting the ability of a country to react to shocks,
particularly idiosyncratic shocks may also place strain on a monetary union.
Before addressing the need for and usefulness of fiscal policy
restrictions i~a monetary union, it is practical to develop a model of a
monetary union which allows one to understand the intra and cross-country
effects of policies.
There has been much written concerning the process of establishing a
monetary union, particularly with respect to the role of a central bank and
the implementation of a common currency. While the process of creation of a
monetary union will be a temporary one, the resultant union is expected to be
permanent. Yet, there has been little written concerning the macroeconomies
of the EC countries operating in a monetary union. Because of this, our
understanding of how economies are linked in a monetary union is limited.
Such an unde’ tanding is vital if the EC follows through on the final two
stages of mon tary union. This is particularly important given that the
European economic and monetary union as set forth in the Maastricht treaty not5
only removes monetary policy from the control of each member country, through
the creation of the independent supranational central bank, but also restricts
the ability of a country to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy.
Modelling a monetary union, such as that expected to occur in the
European Community, presents a problem because it does not fit into the mold
of either a standard closed economy model, or an open economy fixed exchange
rate model The European Community system can not be modelled as a closed
economy typical of federal systems, such as the United States or Canada, due
to the difference in relative importance between the central government and
regional authorities.3 In modelling fiscal policy effects in a typical
federal system one does not worry about the policy interactions and spillover
effects among states, and between states and the central government. This is
due to the dominant role of the central government as fiscal policy maker.
Although states or regions in a federal system set taxation and revenue
policies which have an impact upon the national economy, fiscal policy is
still dominated by the actions of the federal government.
In the European Community, the members of the federation (the national
governments) will continue to be the primary fiscal policy makers. Thus, the
interactions of the regional players are of prime importance in modelling the
monetary union. So, instead of ignoring the effects of fiscal policy
decisions by the state governments (as in a closed economy model of the U.S.),
the model of a monetary union presented here ignores the effects of fiscal
policy decisions made by the Community government.
~ There are those, however who seem to indicate that such a model is
applicable. Both Cohen (1989) and Portes (1990) in discussing the issue of
fiscal policy coordination note that one does not worry about this between states
in the U.S. and thus it may not be a problem for the EC.6
This distinction can be justified by looking at the relative sizes of
fiscal expenditures by U.S. states, versus the “states” of the European
Community. The expenditures of the U.S. federal government constitute around
20-25 percent of U.S. GDP, while the expenditures of even the most populous
states (California and New York) are less than 2 percent of GDP, and the total
expenditures of all 50 states are only about 13 percent of CDP. In contrast,
the expenditures.of the European Community government are at present only
slightly more than 1 percent of the CDP of the EC and are not expected to
exceed 3 percent of GDP (Lamfalussy, 1989, pp. 107 and 111). Furthermore, the
European Community government has no ‘means for active fiscal policy.
A monetary union within the European Community also does not fit into
the model of a fixed exchange rate system. First, the use of a single
currency permanently fixes nominal exchange rates between the member
countries. Revaluation or devaluation of the exchange rate is not possible.
Most important is not the use of a single currency, but rather the common
monetary policy that distinguishes the model of the European monetary union
from that of an open economy fixed exchange rate model. Unlike the standard
Mundell-Fleming fixed exchange rate model where monetary policy has no
effects, in the model of a monetary union, the monetary policy actions of the
central bank affect all countries in the union.
Open-economy models have been developed to analyze issues of
interdependence and policy coordination between countries, and these were used
as a starting point for developing a model of a monetary union. Cohen and
Wyplosz (1989) develop a macroeconomic model of a monetary union in which
aggregate demand in each country is given by one variable which is directly
controlled by the fiscal policy maker, and inflation is a choice variable of7
the central bank. Cohen (1989), Bean (1985) and Pachecco (1985) use slightly
more complex reduced form models to model coordination problems across
countries. All of these use reduced-form models which are useful for
examining issues where the policy effects across countries are well-known, but
they are not adequate to address issues of policy effects within a monetary
union. In the model developed here one can clearly distinguish the direct,
spillover andIfeedback effects on aggregate, demand and aggregate supply. due to
a change in fiscal or monetary policy.
The model developed in this paper is most similar to those of Oudiz and
Sachs (1984), Sachs and Wyplosz (1984), Kole (1988), and Kenen (1989, 1990),
all of which start from the explicit equations for the components of aggregate
demand. Nevertheless, all of these models also have their limitations for
modelling a monetary union. With the exception of Oudiz and Sachs, all of the
models ignore the supply side of the economy. With the exception of Kole,
they ignore interest-income terms in private absorption. This is a fairly
typical restriction in open-economy model, as it simplifies the process of
solving for aggregate demand and equilibrium output and prices. Inclusion of
these terms allows last period’s interest rate to have an effect on this
period’s consumption. Furthermore, in an open-economy model it introduces the
importance of the net-debtor or net-creditor status of a country in the
determination of policy effects.
The model developed here can be used to resolve some of the issues
relating to fiscal policy coordination/restrictions in a monetary union. This
is done by indicating the nature of the spillover effects of fiscal policy in
a monetary union, and addressing the issue of crowding out both internally and8
in other countries within the monetary union. The model developed is useful
in determining monetary policy effects in a monetary union.
The second section develops a two country model of a monetary union.
The third section explains the linkages between the countries as captured in
the aggregate supply and demand equations for each country. The fourth
section gives the solution for equilibrium output and inflation in each
‘country, and, derives comparative ‘statics which indicate how the .policies of , ‘
one country affect both countries’within the monetary union. This section
also examines how the existence of ‘a monetary union changes the results of the
standard two country open economy model. The final section presents the
conclusions and indicates areas for further research.
II. THE MODEL
There are two countries, indexed by 1 and 2, which are of similar size.
Each country maintains independent control over its fiscal policy, but the
monetary policy for the two countries is controlled by an independent central
bank.
The countries produce goods which are imperfect substitutes. Goods are
traded freely between the two countries. There are no transportation costs,
but preferences for goods may vary across the countries. The government and
the private sector in each country demand both domestic and foreign goods.
Each government issues one period bonds which are bought by the
residents of each country and the central bank. The bonds are perfect
substitutes, and capital is perfectly mobile. Thus, the nominal interest rate
prevailing in each country at all times is the world interest rate (i.e.9
Lt=ti~~L
2~
). There are no private issues of bonds, nor is there any capital
accumulation.
There is a common currency, the ecu, which is issued by the central
bank. Money creation is controlled solely by the central bank, through bond
purchases.4 At the end of each period, the governments repay their bonds
plus interest., Thus, money is no.t’ held across periods. Since the real money
supply ~i’s equal to th’e real value of bonds held by the central bank; the ‘
government makes its interest payments not in money but in goods. The central
bank however, neither purchases goods, nor does it turn its profits over to
the national governments. Therefore, one can assume that the goods payment of
interest is immediately consumed by the central bank.5
All variables are measured in real terms. The deflator used to convert
a country’s nominal variables to real variables is its consumer price index.
(See Table I for a listing of variables and ‘parameters.) All stock variables
are measured at the start of the period, which is indexed by t. Spending and
portfolio decisions are made at the start of period t. Thus, ~ is the t to
t÷linterest rate, and it~ is the t to t+l inflation rate.
“ Since the money supply is determined solely by the extent of bond
purchases by the central bank, it is possible that the monetary authority might
be constrained in its ability to increase the money supply. Given that this
constraint is unlikely to be binding except in cases of hyperinflation, and given
that the central bank’s primary objective is price stability, it is assumed
throughout that the constraint is nonbinding.
~ This assumption is made to ensure that the central bank does not have
control over goods or the allocation of seignorage in the model. An alternative
would be to divide the seignorage in accordance with the provision of the
Maastricht treaty, i.e. proportionate to each country’s paid up share of capital
in the central bank, which in turn is determined by the population and GDP of
each country (Maastricht Treaty articles 32, par 5 and 29, par 1). This
alternative was rejected as it would significantly complicate the model, without
changing the nature of the results.10
Country l’s Economy
The equations describing country l’s economy are listed in Table II.
Equations (l)-(3) describe the supply side of the economy. Domestic price
inflation, equation (1), is determined by the deviation of output from its
natural level, and expected domestic price inflation. This gives a standard
expectations augmented Phillips curve. The consumer price index is given by
..equation(2) as ‘a weighted average of domestic and foreign’prices. , The
weights are set in the initial period, as determined by the proportion of
consumption consisting of domestic goods and imports, respectively.’
The demand side of the model, for country 1, is given by equations (4)-
(13). Equations (4) and (5) are versions of the Fisher equation. They define
the ex ante and ex post real interest rate, respectively. Equation (6)
defines p as the ratio of country 2’s to country l’s consumer prices. This
term is used to convert country 2’s real variables, which appear in country
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where G2~is nominal spending by the government of country 2. Therefore, all
of the real variables in country l’s demand and supply equations are in terms
of country l’s consumer price index, and all of the real variables in country
2’s demand and supply equations are in terms of country 2’s consumer price
index.
6 As is the practice with consumer price indexes, ‘these weights are not
adjusted each period, but may be updated after a number of years. For the
purpose of this paper, there is no updating.11
Equations (7)-(ll) describe the goods market. Equation (7) is the
national income identity. Real income (output) is equal to real private
domestic absorption, a~,real government spending, g~, and real net exports,
nx~. Real private domestic absorption, equation (8), depends positively on
real disposable income, y~d, and negatively on the ex ante real interest rate,
Re”. ‘ Real disposable income, y~d, is given by equation (9), as real income
less taxes, t~,•(where”taxes are lump sum), plus real interest earning~and
the repayment of bonds bought by the private sector last period (where these
two terms are by definition the gross real interest earnings on private
holdings of bonds, r~ib~~i).7 Real net exports are given by equation (10).
They are positively related to country 2’s private and government purchases of
country l’s goods, and negatively related to country l’s private and
government purchases of country 2’s goods.8 The government budget constraint
is given by equation (11). Real government spending, g~, is constrained by
the real interest payments and repayments of last period’s bonds (as noted
‘ The term r1,~jb~i,~i is derived as follows:
IC \ (C (C
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b~1~1 denotes private bond holdings deflated by period t-l consumer prices.
Thus, to determine the real time t value of period t-l’s bond purchases, it is
necessary to multiply this term by the ratio of period t-l to period t’s consumer
prices.
~ Neither the private marginal propensity to consume, , nor the
government’s marginal propensity to consume, ~, is a function of relative
prices. In an earlier version of this paper, a parameter was included in the net
export equations of the two countries to capture the price substitution effect.
The inclusion of this parameter only alters the subsequent analysis if there is
a large divergence in prices between the two countries.12
above, these two combined give by definition the gross real interest payments
on bonds, r~1b~1),9 less tax revenues, t~, and new bond issues, b~. In each
period the government can choose, at most, two of the three contemporaneous
variables: government spending, taxes, and/or bond issues. The creation of
an independent central bank removes the ability of the government to finance a
deficit through money creation.
Equations ‘(12) and (13) describe the asset mark~ts. Demand for real’
balances, equation (12), depends positively on real disposable income, via the
transactions motive, and negatively on the nominal interest rate. Thus, an
increase in the interest rate on government bonds will decrease the demand for
money. As noted above, since the bonds issued by each country are perfect
substitutes, there is only one nominal interest rate. The savings function is
given by equation (13). All saving is through bond holdings, and real private
bond demand is determined by the difference between real disposable income and
real private domestic absorption.’°
~ For the derivation of the term r1~1b1~1 see footnote 14.
~ Equation (13) can also be used to derive the balance of payments
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Now, using equation (28) to replace the bond variables with the individual
components of bond demand results in the balance of payments equation:
(continued...)13
Country 2’s Economy
The parameter values in the model for country 2’s economy are assumed to
be the same as those for country 1.11 Thus, the equations modelling country
2’s economy, which are given in Table III, are basically the same as those for
country 1. However, the variables for country 2’s economy are deflated by its
consumer price index. Furthermore, since the natural level of output ~ is
measured in units of: country l’.~goods, division’by p is necessary in equation
(18) to convert it into units of country 2’s goods.
Market Equilibrium Conditions
The conditions for equilibrium in the bond, money and goods markets are
presented in Table IV. The bonds issued by the government of country i
(i~l,2)are held by three groups of agents: the public in country i, the
public in country j, and the central bank. Equation (28) shows the equality
between the supply of bonds issued by country 1, and the demand for these
bonds, broken down by type of demander. Equation (29) presents the same
information for country 2. Equation (30) is the world bond market equilibrium
condition.
The actual holdings by the residents in the two countries, of the bonds
issued by each government is impossible to determine. This follows from the
bonds being perfect substitutes and from the assumption of perfect capital
10( . .continued)
b~~+b21~— b 1~, ~—b12,—b~,,,
— r1, ~~ +b21 ~_1fi 1—b11,~_1—b12, ~ —~)= nxi. ~
b21 ~.~5~b12
tbim = nx1 +r1 ~ (ba, ~_1~~.1—b12, t—1’~’1m. —~~
~ This assumption is made both for simplicity and to keep the asymmetries
between the two countries to a minimum.14
mobility. Only by placing restrictions on the preferences of the individual
bondholders (e.g. bondholders prefer to hold x% of their portfolio in their
home country’s bonds) can exact holdings be determined.’2 The central bank’s
holding of each bond is determined through the money market restrictions, as
explained below.
Equation (31) gives the money market clearing condition, stating that
the supply of real balaüces ‘by the central .bank is ‘equal’ to .the combined
demand of the two countries. The supply of real balances is determined by the
central bank’s purchases of each government’s bonds, as gi’4ren by
equation (32). The next two equations, (33) ‘and (34), det;ermine the central
bank’s holdings of each country’s bonds. For simplicity, it is assumed that
the central bank buys half of its bonds from country 1 and half from
country 2.’~ These four equations indicate that while the initial
distribution of real balances between the countries is determined by the
central bank, the ultimate distribution is determined by demand conditions in
each country.
Equation (35) gives the goods market clearing condition for either
country. Real disposable income less domestic absorption and the government
deficit must be equal to the real current account balance.
12 Such restrictions would change the magnitude of the interest rate
effects due to an increase in bond issues by the governments. Furthermore, the
magnitude of such effects could differ depending on which government issued the
bonds if the residents of both countries prefer the bonds of one government over
the bonds of the other. This in turn could change the fiscal policy effects
derived in this model.
13 Relaxing this assumption will not affect the model.15
Assumptions on the Parameters
It is assumed that ~y> 1/2, which indicates that the residents of each
country prefer their own goods to foreign goods. The marginal propensity to
consume domestic goods out of disposable income, c, is assumed to be greater
than 1/2, and thus the marginal propensity to consume imported goods, , must
be less than 1/2. These two assumptions also correspond to the preference for
home goods over foreign goods in each’country. Furthermore, the government’s
marginal propensity to import, ~, is constrained to be not greater than the
private marginal propensity to import, .‘~
III. AGGREGATE SUPPLY AND AGGREGATE DEMAND
Using equations (l)-(3) and (l4)-(l6) one can derive the aggregate
supply equations for country 1 and country 2:15
(36) Yi,e = + Y [y3













Pt a ~ y2y4
where:
14 This restriction is made since in practice a large portion of government
spending goes towards the salaries of government workers, and governments
generally do not have a weaker preference for domestically produced goods over
foreign goods than do their citizens.
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Each country’s aggregate supply is determined by the natural level of output,
the period t-l to t expected change in the consumer price index and the period
t-l to t actual change in the consumer price index in both countries. Prices
in country 2 influence supply in country 1 (and vice versa) through their
effect on consumer prices in each country.
Given the restrictions on the weights in the consumer price indices of
the two countries, it is possible to determine the sign of the coefficients on
the inflation terms in each aggregate supply equation. Since y>l/2, it
follows that:
— Y2T4 > 0
An increase in a country’s own inflation rate, holding inflationary
expectations constant, has a positive effect on its output, which implies that
the short-run aggregate supply curve is ‘upward sloping in inflation-output
space. The increase in inflation will decrease short-run aggregate supply in
the other country. The long-run aggregate supply curve for each country is
vertical.
The process of solving for aggregate demand indicates clearly the links
between the two countries, through the goods, money and bond markets. The17
first step in solving for aggregate demand in each country is the derivation
of output in country i as an explicit function of output in country j and
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Equation (38) can be used to determine the direct and feedback demand linkages
between the two countries, a process which is lost when one begins with a
reduced form demand equation.
The coefficients on the exogenous variables in equation (38) show the
direct effects of these variables on aggregate demand in country 1. For
government expenditures in country 2 directly affect country 1,
that they increase country l’s exports, and to the extent that
the world interest rate. The export effect is itself comprised
of two parts: a positive effect due to the increase in spending on imports by




16 See Appendix A for the derivations.18
resulting from a decline in private spending on imports in country 2 which
occurs given that the increase in government spending was financed by an
increase in taxes.17 This latter effect is measured by c. Thus, the
overall direct impact of an increase in government spending by country 2 on
aggregate demand in country 1 is indeterminate.
The term ~2t in equation (38) captures the feedback effects of the
exogenous variables on output in country 1. A change in any of the’ exogenous
or predetermined variables in equation (38) not only has a direct effect on
output in country 1 through the linkages between the goods, money and bond
markets in the two countries but also has a feedback effect on aggregate
demand in country 1 resulting from the effect on aggregate demand in
country 2. Returning to the example of an increase in government spending by
country 2, this not only directly affects country 1, as explained above, but
also affects country 1 through its impact on demand in country 2. An increase
in spending by the government in country 2 will increase income in country 2
which in turn will have spillover effects on country 1 by increasing trade and
the world interest rate.
Thus, there are two channels of influence through which an exogenous
variable affects aggregate demand in country i: a direct one through the
initial effects on the markets in country i and an indirect one through the
impact on output in country j which in turn works through the market linkages
to affect demand in country i. This indirect, or feedback effect will be
negative if A 4’ > c 0.
17 Since the government’s budget constraint given in equation (11) must be
met, an increase in g2t holding b2~ constant implies that taxes, t2~ are
increased.I ‘ ‘ 19 ‘
Solving for output in country 2 as an explicit function of output in
country 1, and substituting the resultant equation into equation (38), is the
final step in the solution for aggregate demand for country 1. The aggregate
demand equation for country 1 which results from this procedure is
(39) Y,,~= A, g,~+ A2 b,~ + A3 ~ + A4 g2,~i5~ + A5 ~ + ~
+ A.
7 bm,t + A8 r,~ ~ (b21.~,..,ffl .., — b,2,~..,) ,
+ ~ ~ ‘‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘,
Likewise, the final form of the aggregate demand equation for country 2
is
(40) Y2,t = A, g2,~+ A2 b2~
+ A3 ~ + A4 g,~(Tk) + A5 b,~(i)
+ A6
~ (T~) + A
7 bmt(i~) + A8 r2. _,(b,2.~_,_,~!__ —
1b 1~ + A
9 r, ~_, -;;- in, t1 I
~P~_,
where the coefficients A, - A9 are given in Table V.
Using equations (Sb) and (18b), the aggregate demand equations (39) and
(40) can then be rewritten as
(41) y,~= A, g,~+ A2 b,~+ A3
it~ + A4 g2,~p~ + A5 b2,~p~ + A4 1t~,d5~
+ A, bmt + ~ t-iYi — iti,20
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The slope of each country’s aggregate demand curve (-l/Y~) in period t
depends on the next debtor/creditor status of each country in period t-l.
Given that this is a two country model, both countries can not be net
creditors. Furthermore, given the existence of a common independent central
bank, one country must be a net debtor.’8 When country 1i snot a net
debtor, the amount of country 2’s bonds held by the residents of country 1
must be greater than the amount of country l’s bonds held by the residents of
country 2 (b21p > b,~). Likewise, when country 2 is not a net debtor, the
18 In this system the sum of the balance of payment accounts of two
countries does not equal zero, but instead equals the central bank’s holdings of
bonds less its real interest earnings from last period’s holdings of bonds. This
can be shown as follows:
bop,~+ bop2
= nx,,~+ r,~_, ~
+ b,2, +b,~,~_b21,~~ +
(,.. 1 ~
+ r,, t-,V’,2, t~,Z U
21
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amount of country l’s bonds held by the residents of country 2 must be greater
than the amount of country 2’s bonds held by the residents of country 1 (b,2 >
b21p). If both countries are net debtors, the absolute value of the
difference between the cross border bond holdings of country 1 and country 2
is restricted to be less than half of the bond holdings of the central bank
(~b2, - b,21 < 1/2 bm). , . ‘‘
These conditions indicatethat the ability’of one country aloneto,bea
net borrower is constrained by the willingness of the residents of the other
country to be lenders. This indicates that even if the central bank is
unwilling to finance the expansionary policies of a country, it can still
pursue these policies as long as the residents of the other country are
willing to lend to it. That is, given the lack of capital controls between
the two countries, as long as the residents of one country are willing to
finance the deficit spending of the other, neither the central bank nor the
other government will be able to prevent or constrain the expansionary
policies of one government. The central bank will still be able to constrain
one government to the extent that it is willing to use restrictive monetary
policies which will affect both countries. There are several issues to
consider in this regard. The first is the relative impact of restrictive
monetary polices on both countries, versus the impact of the expansionary
fiscal policies on both countries. The ‘second is the relative impact of the
two policies on the country pursuing expansionary fiscal policies. A third
issue is the willingness of the “errant” country to challenge the central bank
and to engender the disdain of its neighbors. All of these factors are likely22 ‘ ‘
to be significant in determining policy outcomes. The first two issues are
considered further below.19
In order for a country’s aggregate demand curve to be downward sloping,
it is necessary that A4’ > 2c0. This is the same condition which indicates
that the feedback effect in equation 38 is negative.20 This condition is
also useful in determining the signs of some of the coefficients in the
aggregate demand equations~. These coefficients (see Table V),indicate. the
overall effect of changes in the policy and exogenous variables on aggregate
demand in each country.
The direct, feedback and overall effects of an increase in the variables
in the aggregate demand equation for country i are given in Table VI. An
increase in real expenditures by country l’s government, financed by taxes,
directly increases aggregate demand in country 1, as shown in Figure 1. The
increase in government expenditures has a spillover effect on country 2,
increasing its aggregate demand, through an increase in exports by country 2
to country 1. This increase in aggregate demand in country 2 has a net
crowding out effect, and thus contracts aggregate demand in country 1.
Although this feedback effect is negative, it is not strong enough to offset
the initial increase in aggregate demand in country 1. The increase in
~ Another issue which is outside the realm of this model is whether such
expansionary policies will cause the residents of the two countries to view the
bonds of the expansionary government as risky, and require a risk premium, which
will drive a wedge between interest rates on the bonds. Such a premium depends
on the belief that the government in question is likely to default on its debt.
20 Even with this condition, it is possible that when one country is a net
debtor and the other a net creditor, the aggregate demand curve for the net
debtor country could be upward sloping. This result does not change the
comparative static analysis in the following section. To simplify the
discussion, it is assumed that both countries’ aggregate demand curves are
downward sloping.23
country l’s aggregate demand also feeds back into country 2’s aggregate
demand, causing a diminishing of the original spillover effect (Figure 1). In
both countries, the overall effect of a tax financed increase in country l’s
government expenditures is an increase in aggregate demand.
An increase in real expenditures by country l’s government, financed
thro~tghbond issues, directly increases aggregate demand in country 1 and has
‘a pósitive’spillover effect on country 2 (Figure 2). As with,’ tax financed
expenditures the resultant increase in income in one country has a negative
feedback effect on aggregate demand in the other country. For country 1, the
direct effect is stronger than the feedback effect resulting in an increase in
aggregate demand. For country 2, the overall effect is indeterminate.
An increase in the real bond holdings of the central bank increases
aggregate demand in both countries. This comes directly from the increase in
real balances’ shifting out the LM curve. In both countries, the feedback
effect is negative but not strong enough to offset the direct effect.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM INFLATION AND OUTPUT
The equilibrium inflation and output equations for country 1 and
country 2 are given in Tables VII and VIII. These were derived using the
aggregate demand and supply equations discussed in Section V.2’
Comparative Statics
In the standard closed economy model an increase in government spending
increases aggregate demand and so has a positive effect on output and prices.
An increase in bonds issued by the government causes a contraction in
21 See Appendix B for these derivations.24
aggregate demand by pushing up interest rates and thereby decreasing
investment. Thus output and prices decline. The overall effect of a bond
financed increase in government spending on output and prices is generally
positive; the crowding out of investment which occurs is not complete.
Expansionary monetary policy carried out through open market purchases
increases output and inflation in the closed economy, by shifting out the LM
“curve and’ thus increasing aggregate demand. ‘‘ I
In a model of a large open economy with perfect capital mobility and
fixed exchange rates, both the fiscal and monetary policy actions of a country
also have an effect on the rest of the world.’ Expansionary fiscal pclicy,
regardless of how it is financed, has an ambiguous effect on output and prices
abroad. The increased spending at home increases aggregate demand abroad
through trade effects. At the same time, however, the increase in the world
interest rate dampens demand overseas. A bond financed fiscal expansion will
increase the magnitude of the latter effect. In large open economy models it
is uncertain as to whether the trade effect or “the interest rate effect
dominates. Buiter (1988) states that if the countries are of similar size,
then a fiscal expansion at home will always have a positive effect on world
output and inflation. In the large country case, a monetary expansion at home
has a positive effect on output and inflation abroad.
As noted previously, standard open economy models focus on the demand
side of the economy. Even where a supply side is modelled,’ these models
ignore connections between the demand and supply side of economies. In the
model developed in this paper countries are linked on the demand side through
the goods market and assets market. Thus, policies which affect aggregate
demand in one country lead to spillover effects on demand in the other25
country. Because of the market linkages, changes in inflation in one country
affect the other country. This link comes through the supply side of the
economies. Thus, a change in inflation in one country will lead to spillover
effects on supply in the other country.
The comparative statics for the model of a monetary union developed in
this chapter are given in lables IX and X. The first column in each table
gives the comparative statics which resuli from focusing only on demand
effects.22 Tax financed expansionary fiscal policy will increase output and
inflation in both countries. The increase at home will be larger than the
increase abroad. Bond financed fiscal policy will increase output and
inflation at home, but will decrease output and inflation abroad.
Expansionary monetary policy will increase output and inflation in both
countries. These results may be weakened or reversed through the inclusion of
supply effects (see column three in Table IX and X). Determining the
conditions under which supply effects weaken or offset demand effects requires
an analysis of the spillover demand effects an’d the magnitude of the supply
effects.
Determining the Comparative Statics
For every policy variable in the equilibrium output and inflation
equations there are two separate effects that determine the overall effect of
a change in that variable on output and inflation.23 A change in fiscal or
22 The analysis for equilibrium output and inflation, in this section,
considers only the overall change in demand, and does not look at the component
effects.
23 The analysis concentrates on the effects as given by the numerators of
the coefficients on the variables in the output and inflation equations. There
(continued...)26
monetary policy has a direct effect on aggregate demand, resulting in a change
in a country’s inflation rate. The feedback effect captures the subsequent
impact of this change in inflation on aggregate supply in the other
country.24 In most cases the aggregate supply effects reinforce the
inflation effects of the change in aggregate demand, but weaken the output
effects. ‘
There are ‘two ‘potept:ial sources for indeterminacy in ‘signing’ the ‘
comparative static effects. First, as noted in Table V, the overall demand
effect on a country of bond financed fiscal policy changes by the other
country is indeterminate, which in turn presents a source of ambiguity in
determining the equilibrium output and inflation effects. Second, as noted
above, in many cases the feedback effects work to offset the effect of a
change in aggregate demand on output. The overall effect depends on the
direction of the changes in aggregate demand and aggregate supply and the
magnitudes of these two changes.
An important determinant of the effects o’f policies on output and
inflation is the steepness of a country’s aggregate demand curve. The flatter
the slope of the aggregate demand curve the larger is the effect of a shift in
aggregate supply on output and the smaller is the effect of a shift in
aggregate supply on inflation. The slope of the aggregate demand curve -
23( . .continued)
are a two reasons for this emphasis. First, given that i>l/2, and Y1 and Y2 are
both positive, then ~2,is positive. Therefore, determining the comparative
static effects of a change in one of the exogenous variables is equivalent to
determining the sign of the numerator of the exogenous variable in question.
Also, it is the behavioral parameters in the numerator which are driving the
aggregate demand and supply effects.
24 As shown by equations (36) and (37), an increase in inflation in country
i will decrease aggregate supply in country j.27
(l/Y1), is determined by last period’s current account balance of a country.
If a country was a net debtor (net creditor) last period its aggregate demand
curve will be relatively steep (flat). An increase in inflation reduces the
real interest earnings on private holdings of bonds, thereby reducing
disposable income (equations 9 and 22). An increase in inflation also
reduces the government’s real interest payments on bonds, thereby reducing the
government’ deficit (equations 11 and 24). Since the aggregate demand curve
for a ‘country is downward sloping regardless of whether it is a net creditor
or a net debtor, an increase in inflation produces a net negative effect on
output (the output effect of the inflation benefit ‘to the government can not
fully offset the output effect of the inflation cost to the private sector).
As expected, a net creditor nation is hurt more by inflation than a net debtor
nation, which is reflected in the flatter aggregate demand curve for a net
creditor and the steeper aggregate demand curve for a net debtor.
The importance of the slopes of the aggregate demand curves for
determining the comparative statics can be illustrated by examining the two
types of policy effects which are present in the model: 1) expansionary
policies which have positive effects on aggregate demand in both countries;
and, 2) expansionary policies which have positive effects on aggregate demand
at home, but negative spillover effects on aggregate demand.
Policies which fall into the first category initially increase inflation
abroad which causes a decline in aggregate supply at home. The supply effect
strengthens the positive own demand effect on inflation but weakens the demand
effect on output. As shown in Figure 4, if a country is a net creditor the
supply effect is more likely to offset the demand effect on output. Whereas,
if a country is a net debtor the supply effect is less likely to offset the28
demand effect on output. This follows from the fact that inflation is less
harmful (in output terms) to a net debtor than to a net creditor.
Policies which fall into the second category lead to a reduction in
inflation abroad (due to negative demand spillovers) which causes an increase
in aggregate supply at home. Since the home demand effect is positive, the
supply effect strengthens the demand effect on output but weakens the demand
effect on’infiation. In this case, as shown in Figure 5, a net debtor country’
is more likely to experience an overall decrease in inflation than a net
creditor. However, the output effect is larger for a net creditor than for a
net debtor. This result follows from the greater benefit of a reduction in
inflation to a net creditor than to a net debtor.
In the foreign country aggregate demand decreases due to the spillover
effect, and given the increase in inflation in the home country, foreign
aggregate supply will also decrease, Figure 6. This shift in aggregate supply
reinforces the demand induced decrease in output but works to counteract the
demand induced decrease in inflation. The overall effect on output will be
greater if the foreign country is a net creditor. Inflation is more likely to
increase if the foreign country is a net debtor.
Policies pursued by one country will have differing effects on the two
countries due to differences in the demand effects in the countries and due to
differences in the past behavior of the two countries. The more similar the
past policies of the two countries, the more similar the current account
balances of the two and thus the more similar the slopes of their aggregate
demand curves. If the countries are symmetric25 the two aggregate demand
curves have the same slope. In this case an expansionary policy pursued by
25 Symmetry arises if ~29
country 1 has the same effect on country 2a san expansionary policy pursued
by country 2 has on country 1. If the countries are not symmetric this does
not hold. For example, if country 1 is a net creditor and country 2 is a net
debtor, an expansionary fiscal policy pursued by country 1 may increase output
in country 2, but an expansionary fiscal policy pursued country 2 may decrease
output in country 1. In general, policies which increase aggregate demand in
both. countries are less likely to have ‘an’ overall positive output spillover if
the country pursuing the policies is a net debtor and the other country is a
net creditor.
Policy Effects: Country 1 is a Net Debtor, Country 2 is a Net Creditor2’
A tax financed increase in government spending in country 1 has a
positive effect on its own aggregate demand (A, > 0), and the increase in
spending also raises aggregate demand in country 2 (A4 > 0). This policy fits
into category 1, given above. The shift in aggregate demand in country 1
increases its inflation rate which reduces aggregate supply in country 2.
Likewise, inflation in country 2 increases which reduces aggregate supply in
country 1. Therefore, in both countries, the effect on inflation is
compounded but the effect on output is reduced, Figure 7.
Since country 1i sanet debtor the slope of its aggregate demand curve
is relatively steep which acts to limit the effect on output of a reduction in
aggregate supply. Thus, the expansionary fiscal policy increases inflation
and output in country 1. The output effect on country 2i sless likely to be
26 The analysis in this section concentrates on the effects of changes in
policies by country 1 on the two countries. The analysis is the same with
respect to changes in country 2’s policy variables. See appendix D for the
derivation of the comparative static results given in this section.30
positive. Given that A4<A,, aggregate demand increases less in country 2 than
in country 1. Thus, the direct effect on output is smaller. Also, since
country 2 is a net creditor, the slope of its aggregate demand curve is
relatively flat (inflation is more harmful to country 2 than it is to
country 1). The decrease in aggregate supply exacerbates inflation and so
causes a large (relative to country 1) reduction in output. It is possible
that the ‘negative supply effect on output more than offsets the positive
demand effect on output, and output decreases in country 2. Given that
inflation definitely increases, expansionary fiscal policy undertaken by
country 1 can lead to stagflation in country 2. The greater the asymmetry
between the countries, the greater the differences in the output effects.
A bond financed fiscal expansion by country 1 has a positive effect on
aggregate demand in country 1, but the spillover effect on demand in country 2
may be positive or negative. If aggregate demand in country 2 increases
(A4+A5>O) then the effects on the two countries will be similar to a tax
financed fiscal expansion. Output and inflation in country 1 will increase.
In country 2 inflation will increase but output may decrease. The more
asymmetric the two countries the more likely that the fiscal expansion in
country 1 will decrease output in country 2.
If aggregate demand in country 2 decreases as a result of the fiscal
expansion in country 1 (A4+A5<O), this will bring about a decline in inflation
in country 2 which increases aggregate supply in country 1. Since the fiscal
expansion had a positive demand effect in country 1, the shift in aggregate
supply strengthens the effect on output but weakens the effect on inflation,
Figure 8. Overall, output in country 1 increases, and since the supply effect
is not strong enough to offset the demand effect on inflation, inflation also31
increases. In country 2 there is a decrease in aggregate demand and, due to
the increase in inflation in country 1, a decrease in aggregate supply. Both
of these shifts work to reduce output but the demand shift decreases inflation
while the supply shift works to offset that decrease. As with country 1, the
demand effect is stronger than the supply effect and so inflation falls.
Consequently, it is possible for a fiscal expansion by country 1 to increase
output and inflation in country l,,while having the opposite effect on ‘
inflation and output in country 2.
Expansionary monetary policy results in an increase in real balances,
and has an identical effect on aggregate demand in the two countries. The
increase in aggregate demand in country 1 increases its inflation rate which
causes a decrease in aggregate supply in country 2. Likewise, the increase in
aggregate demand in country 2 increases its inflation rate which causes a
decrease in aggregate supply in country 1. Thus, the aggregate supply effects
further increase inflation in both countries, but work to offset the demand
induced increases in output in both countries. ‘In both countries the overall
effect is an increase in inflation and output. However, the increase in
inflation and output is greater in country 1 than in country 2, as shown in
Figure 9. This result follows from the fact that country 1 is a net debtor
and country 2 is a net creditor. The slope of the aggregate demand curve in
country 1 is steep relative to that in country 2. Thus, as explained above, a
shift in aggregate supply has a relatively greater effect on inflation in
country 1 and a relatively greater effect on output in country 2. Since the
supply effect and demand effect both lead to an increase in inflation, the
overall inflation rate is higher in country 1. Since the change in supply32
reduces the demand effect on output, the overall change in output is greater
in country 1.
Policy Effects: Country 1 is a Net Creditor, Country 2 is a Net Debtor
A tax financed increase in government spending in country 1 increases
output and inflation in country 1. Since country 1 is’ a net creditor the
slope of its aggregate demand curve is ‘relatively flat which acts to ‘limit the’
effect on inflation of a reduction in aggregate supply, but increases the
effect on output, as shown in Figure 10. Thus, the output and inflation
effects, although positive are smaller than in the case where country 1i sa
net debtor. Given that country 2 is a net debtor the slope of its aggregate
demand curve is relatively steep. The steepness of the slope limits the
effect of a reduction in aggregate supply on output. Thus, expansionary
fiscal policy conducted by country 1 has a positive effect on output and
inflation in country 2. These effects are greater than in the case where
country 2 is a net creditor.
The effects of a bond financed fiscal expansion by country 1 depend on
whether the demand spillover effect on country 2 is positive or negative. If
aggregate demand in country 2 increases (A4+A5>0) then, as in the case where
country 1 is a net debtor and country 2 a net creditor, the effects on the two
countries will be similar to a tax financed fiscal expansion. Output and
inflation in both countries will increase, with the effects on country 1 being
greater in the case where country 1 is a net debtor and country 2 a net
creditor, and the effects on country 2 are smaller in this case.
If aggregate demand in country 2 decreases as a result of the fiscal
expansion in country 1 (A4+A5<O) both aggregate demand and aggregate supply in33
country 1 increase as shown in Figure 11. Both of these increases in turn
increase output, and since the supply effect is not strong enough to offset
the demand effect on inflation, inflation also increases. In country 2, the
decline in aggregate demand and the decline in aggregate supply both work to
reduce output. The demand shift decreases inflation while the supply shift
works to offset that decrease. The overall effect on inflation is
indeterminTate~ The effects on’country 1 are once again greater than in the
case where country 1i sa net debtor and country 2anet creditor, while the
effects on country 2 are smaller.
Expansionary monetary policy results in an increase in inflation and
output in both countries. Although the nature of the effects are the same as
in the case where country 1i sanet debtor and country 2 a net creditor, the
magnitudes are reversed. When country 1i sanet creditor and country 2 is a
net debtor, the increase in inflation and output is greater in country 2 than
in country 1 as shown in Figure 9.
In sum, if a country is a net debtor any ‘expansionary policies which it
enacts or which are undertaken by the central bank have a greater effect on
its inflation rate and level of output than if it is a net creditor. If a
country is a net debtor expansionary policies undertaken by the other country
are more likely to have positive effects on its output and inflation rate than
if it is a net creditor.
These results differ from the standard open economy models due not only
to the inclusion of supply effects, but also the addition of interest earnings
in the aggregate demand equations for the two countries. The inclusion of
supply effects are important because they may work to offset the effects of a
change in demand on output and/or inflation. Therefore, the supply effects34
can change the results one would obtain by solely concentrating on the demand
side of economies. The addition of interest earnings in the aggregate demand
equations is the means by which the net debtor/creditor status of a country
affects the model. As shown above, this status determines the
steepness/flatness of the slope of the demand curve which weakens or
strengthen the effects of a shift in aggregate supply on output and inflation.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper develops a two-country model of a monetary union. In order
to depict more fully the nature of the linkages between the countries and the
central bank, the model does not begin with reduced form equations, but
derives these equations based on a structural model of goods market, bond
market and money market interaction. Furthermore, the model developed in this
paper does not make the common assumption that output is demand determined,
but instead also develops a supply side of the economy to capture both the
demand and supply effects on output and inflation. A monetary union
introduces linkages between the two countries so that fiscal policy pursued by
one country or monetary policy pursued by the central bank affects both
aggregate supply and demand in the two countries. The overall effect of a
policy on each country’s output and inflation rate depends not only on who
pursued the policy (a country’s own fiscal policy has a greater effect on its
aggregate demand than does fiscal policy pursued by the other country) but
also on last period’s current account balance of each country. In this way
present policies affect both countries through aggregate demand and aggregate
supply links between the countries, but past policies through their effect on35
the current account balances of each country also determine the overall effect
of current policies on output and inflation in each country.
The results of this paper suggest that asymmetries in past policies,
reflected in asymmetries in the current account balances of countries, and the
continuation of asymmetric fiscal policies can be a source of friction among
the countries in a monetary union. Looking at the countries that will
comprise the European Monetary Union, it is clear, that such asymmetries do
exist. In the l98Os France, Italy and Greece had persistent current account
deficits, while the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and
Luxembourg had persistent current account surpluses. , The United Kingdom
started the decade with a current account surplus (due to its oil exports),
but since 1986 it has run current account deficits. In 1989 the current
account deficit of the United Kingdom was equal to 4.1 percent of its GDP,
while the current account surplus of the Federal Republic of Germany was equal
to 4.4 percent of its GDP.
There is evidence that the creation of the European Monetary Union will
increase these asymmetries. Artis and Bayoumi (1991) found that the increase
in capital integration in the world economy in the l98Os corresponded with
growing capital account imbalances. An increase in capital mobility reduces
the external constraints on borrowing. Thus, the European Monetary Union,
which is to be characterized by full capital mobility, is likely to increase
the level and persistence of current account imbalances among its member
countries. Differences in preferences for consumption versus saving among
countries are more easily maintained when countries only need to concern
themselves with a solvency constraint and not an external constraint.36
The findings of this paper indicate that fiscal policy convergence and
the maintenance of convergence through restrictions on fiscal policies may be
necessary to ensure that the monetary union functions smoothly. Restricting
fiscal policies, however, may not produce optimal results in a monetary union
in which the member countries have dissimilar economies. Given the small
degree of labor mobility within the EC and the lack of an automatic
redistribution system constraints on fiscal policies may hinderadjustment to
asymmetric shocks.27 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) find that asymmetric
shocks are more prevalent among the member countries Of the EC than the
regions in the U.S. Furthermore they find that the adjustment to such shocks
in faster in the U.S. which they conclude is likely due to the higher degree
of labor mobility in the U.S. than in Europe.
If fiscal policy restrictions are necessary to ensure the smooth
functioning of a monetary union, but restrictions hinder adjustment to
economic shocks the solution may be to create a “two-speed” Europe. A core
group of EC countries28 that experience similar “shocks would move forward to
form a monetary union, while the other countries would join only when their
economies become similar to those of the core. Another solution is to
increase the budgetary powers of the European Community government so that it
can use taxes and transfer payments to ease the burden of asymmetric shocks.
27 This point has been made by several economists including DeGrauwe (1992)
and Feldstein (1992). It is possible that the Maastricht treaty will be
interpreted as allowing for deviations in fiscal policies to react to asymmetric
shocks. This, however, will depend on the willingness of the Council, and
therefore, the member countries to tolerate such deviations.
28 France, Germany and the Benelux countries are usually suggested as
comprising this core.37
However, given the increasing emphasis on subsidiarity this latter approach is
unlikely to be adopted.
More research is needed to examine the macroeconomic costs and benefits
of monetary union to the members of the European Community. The analysis in
this paper focusses on the impact effects of policies. Two issues which
deserve further study are the possibility of strategic behavior on the part of
the policy makers ma monetary union and the long-run policy effects.
Further research should explore the long run effects on member countries of
allowing independent fiscal policies or of restricting fiscal pOlicies. The
advantage of the model developed in this paper is that it can be used to
address both of these issues.29
29 For example, Pollard (1992) uses the model developed in this paper to
examine policy effects in a strategic setting.38
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Artis, M. and Bayoumi, T. (1991). ‘Global Financial Integration and Current
Account Imbalances’. In External Constraints on Macroeconomic Policy:
The European Experience (ed. C. Alogoskoufis, L. Papademos, ‘and
P.. Portes). New York: Cambridge University Press. ‘
Bayoumi, T. and Eichengreen, B. (1992). ‘Shocking Aspects of European
Monetary Unification’. NBER Working Paper #3949.
Bean, C. R. (1985). ‘Macroeconomic Policy Co-ordination: Theory and
Evidence’. Recherches Econozniques de Louvain, vol 51, pp. 267-283.
Buiter, W. H. (1988). ‘Macroeconomic Policy Design in an Interdependent
World Economy: An Analysis of Three Contingencies’. In International
Aspects of Fiscal Policies (ed. J. Frenkel). Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press.
Buiter, W. H. and Kletzer, K. M. (1991). ‘Reflections on the Fiscal
Implications of a Common Currency’. In European Financial Integration
(ed. A. Giovannini and C. Mayer). New York: Cambridge University
Press.39’
Cohen, D. (1989). ‘Monetary and Fiscal Policy in an Open Economy With or
Without Policy Coordination’. European Economic Review. vol 22,
pp. 303-309.
Cohen, D. and Wyplosz, C. (1989). ‘The European Monetary Union: An Agnostic
Evaluation’. In Macroeconomic Policies in an Interdependent World (ed.
P.. C. Bryant, et al.). Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union. (1989). Report on
Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community. Luxembourg:
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Council of the European Communities and Commission of the European
Communities. (1992). Treaty on European Union. Luxembourg: Office
for Official Publications of the European Communities.
De Grauwe, P. (1990). ‘Fiscal Policies in the EMS - A Strategic Analysis’.
In International and European Monetary Systems (ed. Emil-Maria
Claassen). New York: Praeger Publishers.
De Grauwe, P. (1992). The Economics of Monetary Integration. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Feldstein, M. ‘The Case Against EMU’. The Economist. June 13, 1992.
pp. 19-22.40
Giovannini, A. and Mayer, C. eds. (1991). European Financial Integration.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Glick, P.. and Hutchinson, M. (1992). ‘Budget Rules and Monetary Union in
Europe’. FRBSF Weekly Letter. Number 92-32, September 18, 1992.
Kenen, P. B. (1989).. Exchange Rates and Policy Coordination. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Kenen, P. B. (1990). ‘The Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies’. In
International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Fluctuations (ed.
W. Branson, J. Frenkel and M. Goldstein). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Kale, L. S. (1988). ‘Expansionary Fiscal Policy and International
Interdependence’. In International Aspects of Fiscal Policies (ed.
J. Frenkel). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Lamfalussy, A. (1989). ‘Macro-coordination of Fiscal Policies in an Economic
and Monetary Union in Europe’. In Collection of Papers Submitted to the
Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union. Luxembourg:
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Oudiz, C. and Sachs, J. (1984). ‘Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Among the
Industrial Economies’. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. pp. 1-
75.41
Oudiz, C. (1985). ‘European Policy Coordination: An Evaluation’.
Recherches Economiques de Louvain. vol 51, pp. 301-339.
Pachecco, F. (1985). ‘A Role for an International Institution: A One-Shot
Game-Theoretic Approach’. Recherches Economiques de Louvain, vol 51,
pp. 241-254.
Pollard, P. (1992). ‘Strategic Policymaking in a Monetary Union’.
Unpublished paper.
Portes, R. (1990). ‘Macroeconomic Policy Coordination and the European
Monetary System’. In Prospects for the European Monetary System (ed.
P. Fern).
Sachs, 3. and Wyplosz, C. (1984). ‘Real Exchange Rate Effects of Fiscal
Policy’. NBER Working Paper #1255.Table I: Notation
Variables:
a real private domestic absorption
br-. real private bond holdings
b — real bond issues by the government
bm — real central bank bond holdings
g — real government spending
nominal world interest rate
i~=’l+L ‘ ‘
m real balances
nx real net exports
p — domestic price index
pC consumer price index
P. — real interest rate
r— 1 +R
expected real interest rate
t real lump sum taxes
y = real output
yd — real disposable income
optimal or natural level of real output.
it consumer price inflation
it
0 expected consumer price inflation
d government budget deficit
Parameters:
c marginal propensity to consume
private marginal propensity to import
government marginal propensity to import
A = income sensitivity of money demand
8 = interest sensitivity of money demand
= interest sensitivity of domestic absorption
o = sensitivity of domestic price inflation to deviations of output
from its natural level
-y = weight attached to domestic prices in the consumer price A. idexTable II: Equations Underlying Country l’s Economy
Demand
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(Sb) ~ C —

















CYt — .<c<1, O<$<1
Y2~t= Y2,~+ n2.~1~ — t2,,






























0< A1 , 0<0<1Table IV: Equilibrium Conditions’
Bond Market:
(28) b1~









(31) ,n~= mudt + m2dt .~




(35) yi~ — a.~ — d1~
= ca1~ I = 1, 2
1 All world variables are deflated by country l’s price index. This is
done for simplicity. It is also possible to use the world consumer price index
(a weighted average of the two consumer price indices) to deflate world
variables.Table VI:







Increase in tax financed government ‘ ‘




Increase in bond financed government
expenditures by country i
+ - +
Increase in tax financed government
expenditures by country j
+ - +
Increase in bond financed government
expenditures by country j








= 20c(c—1+e-2ce) + X~(1—2c+4c ) A2 2 (1—c+2ce)’(cO—O—A~)














= 20(1c) (1 g) + 20ce + ).$(12 g) > 0
2 (1—c+2ce) (O—cO+)4)
A4+A~= 2g O + 2CO( ~ g) — )~4(1~2 g)
2(l-c+2ce) (0-cO÷X$)Table VII: Equilibrium Inflation
tu = [ Au[a2Y2i5t(yiy3y:y4) ÷ ay1~]÷A4ay2~~
+[ A2[a2Y2j5~(~y~y3-y2y4) + ay1~ flu
+ [ A3[a2Y2J5~(y1y3’(2y4) + a~y1~) + A4aY2i] ~
a1
÷.[A4 [a2Y2I5~(Y1Y3-Y2Y4) + ay1~
+ A1ay2y } ~
a1
1 b2,,i5~ + E A5[a2Y2j5~(y1y3—y2y4) + ay1~
÷A2ay2~ flu















Y~i5~ + 7) ] ~
a,
— [ a7y2Y2~5~ ~
01















- (y,y3—y2y4) + ay3_XI. + ay44 1
1











Pt Pt + a2 I
+
= ~“~“,_‘~2(YY3Y2Y4) + a—~.-(y1Y1
4-+ y3Y2) ÷
P~ P~
A1 (auY, (y,13-y2y4) + ay3~~ t,
,tz.t_1 =




A3 (a2Yi_4_ (y1y3—y2y4) + a~3_~i) + A6ay4—~-










_L (i1’r3-i2~r4) + C~3_~_’I + A3ay ~‘
4
P~)
a2Table VIII: Equilibrium Output
- 1A,Iay3Y2I5~7+721 - A4aY,y271 g,,~
~ a,
+ [A2(uy3W+ 72) — AsaYi’r37~b,~
flu
+I~~÷ 72) - A6aY,y2y1
~ 01








fi~7 + 72) — A2aY,y2y1 b2, ~ a1
+ IA5[ayiYz~t7+ 72] - A3aY,y2y1 ~ a’
+ I ay3Y2~~7 + 72 - aY1Y2i] A5b a’
+ I aY1Y2j5~(y3—y2) + Y,72 1
— 0,











+ aY,7[ aY2jY~(y,y3—y2y4) + 7(y,+y2) I a’Table VIII (continued)
- A4ay V 1 1
— I




























+ . - A2ay4
2
i5~) PC1~t~
A4 (a~iYu4._~ + - A3ay4Y24.
~2













2 (a’r4y,4- + _~i~ 1
Pt ~,, Pt P~t)
a2
Yl 1

























Country 1 (Net Debtor)
it2
y2















Country 1 (Net Debtor)
y2











































SOLVING FOR AGGREGATE SUPPLY AND DEMAND
This appendix uses the equations in Tables I and II to derive the
solutions for aggregate supply and aggregate demand for country 1, as given by
equations (36) and (39), respectively, in the text. The derivations of the
aggregate supply and demand equations for country 2, are discussed where they
differ from those for country I.
Solving for Aggregate Sutply
Lagging equation (2) yields:
(Al) Pi,t-i = ~ ~-, + (1—y) P2~
~
Substituting equations (2) and (Al) into equation (3) yields:
(4(2) it = ~ + ~ (r2,~—~p2,~1) “~~‘ YP,. ~_~+ (1—y) ~2 ~ ~ ~ (1—y)P2~
~
which can be rewritten as:
(A3) — ( YP,,t-, ~ ~ — L~yp,.t_,+(1—y)p2,t_,) ~
+ ( (1~Y)P~,t, ~ (P2.t~P2.t1
+ (1—Y ) P2,t-~.) ~
Rewriting equation (14) as:30
30 This is done so that in the aggregate supply equation for country
1, all real variables will be measured in the same units.2
(A4) ~ — P2,t-l = ~ ~— 7) + E~_,p21~—p2,~..,
~ Y P2.t—1
Substituting equations (1) and (A4) into equation (A3) yields:
(A5) it = ( yP,,t_,. ~ 3’u, CY + E~_1p,,~ — P~, ,-, 1,t~1 ~ •~p
1
.~ (1Y)P2.t..,) 7 Pi. t—i.
+ ( (1~Y)P2t1 ~ ~ y2,~~~—7 + ~ — ~
\, YP,,t_,~(lY)P2,t_,J Y
Next, solving equations (2) and (15) for Pi,t and P2,t, respectively:
— p,’~ — (l—y)p2t — r.’~ (1—y)p,,~
Y ‘ P2,~y Y
which after some algebra yields:
(A6) p = ~ - ~p2
, (A7) P2t 2,~’1P~’t - _____
Taking expectations at t-l of equations (A6) and (A7) gives:
(A8) ~ = ~ — ____
(A9) E~,p2~ = 2’1E~,pa’~~ — ____
Lagging equations (A6) and (A7), and using equations (A8) and (A9), it is
possible to rewrite:











1 ( YP~t-i 1 (1—y)p,’~~, \
~YP~t-i (1-y)p,~~, j - ~ ~ yp~-,— (l~Y)p,~t, j
respectively.
Making these substitutions into equation (AS) and solving for yit, yields:




= YP,. ~-, + (1 -r) p2. ~ ‘ •~2= ~ + (1-i) P2. ~
YPi’~c-i C _____________________
C
TPu,c-i - (1-Y)p2~t1 ‘ ?2 YPi~t-i — (‘—y)~~-,
YP2.t-1 C _____________________
= YPi~t-u- (1-y)p,~~, ‘ = ~ — (1—y)p,~~-,
Following the same procedure for country 2 yields:4
+ Y~(1~ - ~ (..~) ~ ~
(All) Y2,c = y~ t.~) a~3




1, = __________________ ___________________
‘(4 = _________________
Substituting equation (All) into equation (A1O):
_______ 314?2 I . __________ ( Y2’~I ~+ .z (yjiC C~ +~ (Y3~—Y4?~
I ~ I ~ c—i (A12) Y,.t =(~~) [ ‘(3 a ‘(3 / a








I ~ + c—i
and solving for yit gives:





- Y2Y4) ~ - ~ ~2~t~i]




Thus, the aggregate supply curve for country 1 can be written as:
_______________ — (A14) Y,.t = + a(y,y3-y2y4)
- a (y,y ‘(2 (it2t.., - ~ } 3 - Y~Y~)
To solve for aggregate supply in country 2, substitute equation (AlO) into
equation (All):
— I ~ 1~ + ‘(2 J~— Y H Y2?4 C 1 ~ — ~ 1 ~, ~ ) J (4(15) Y2.t — I——
~ ?~) I. ~, i~a I., [~r — ?~ ~ +
vi
+ (_ii’i I ~~ — ~ 1 y~+~ _____ — Y2.tI +
~Y , j Y~ 15t







and solving for Y2t gives:
(A16) Y2.t = 1 +
~ a (‘(,‘(3-’(2’(4) ~2 ti - ~( 2’(-l) ~
C
___________ — i’412y-1’ e
- I a( )
j. YuY~ — Y2Y4’
It can be shown that
—C Yj —C ‘(4
= YiYii’~Y~’ ‘( = Y1Y~Y2Y4
Thus, the aggregate supply curve for country 2 can be written as:6





Pt ~a (Y~Y3 - 1214) (it,~, — ~ I
Solving for Aggregate Demand
Adding equations (12) and (25) yields:
(A17) mit + m2~p~ = A(y,~~ + Y2~i~~) — 2Ot~
Substituting equation (31) into equation (A17) and solving for £~:
d
(A18) t~= -~ (~‘~ + Y~d~~) — 1 bm.t
Substituting equation (4) into equation (8), and equation (17) into equation
(21) yields:





Substituting equation (Al8) into (Al9):
(A21) a,~= cyd — - d + Y2~cI~~) + ~b +
~ t -~-O-~Yu.t 20 m.t
and substituting equation (A18) into (A20):
(A22) a2~
= cy’~ )~4:i d+ Y,~t-
4
-) + —~--b~4-÷ — Y2.t p~ 20 m,7
Substituting equation (10) into equation (7):
(A23) ~ = (1—c) ai,t + (3. ~~ g) g,~+ ea2, ~ + gg2~ ~ + 11
Substituting equations (A2l) and (A22) into equation (A23):
(A24) y,,~= [(i_c) c — y1~
—[4~ — ec] Y2~tP~
+ _~+O•bmt+ (1—e)dy,t~~ + $it~.~j5~ + (1—e9)g,~+
Substituting equations (9) and (22) into equation (A24):
(A25) Y,,t = [i_ec — ~}~ + ~ —
—~ — ec] ~ + r
2
.~~lb2.~1 — t2t)pt
+ ~ + (1— )$~~r~ + $it~tp~ + (1—eg)g,~+ egg~,~Pt
Solving equation (11) for t1~and equation (24) for t
2~
, and substituting the
resulting equations into equation (A25) yields:
(A26) ~ = [(1_e) c — ~ (Yi.t + ~ —— ~ + b,~)
— ~ — ec} (Y2,t + ~ — g2~ — 12.t_1b2.t_i + b2~)p~
+ ~bm,t + (1— )~~r.~ + e$it~~i5~ + (1—eg)g,,~+ gg2,~P~
Solving equation (A26) for y,t gives country l’s aggregate demand as a
function of aggregate demand in country 2:8
— [(i—es) - (1—c) c] 20 +
(A27) Y,.t - - (1-e)c)20) +~









Hi - (i-e)c)20 + A,~2.tPt
+ I (g — c)20 +
[(1 - - ~~o +
r 2cc0-14
+ [(1 - (i-e)c)20 + ~ (bf~,-
2ce0 — 4 ]b2 ~ + [ 2e~8
1(1 - (i-e)c)20 + . (1-(1-e) c) 20 +
20 - (1-e)2~+
equivalently, solving for Y2t in terms of yit yields:
—[ (i—c) — (i—e)c]20 + 41
(A28) Y2t ~1 (1 — (i— )c)20) + 4
+ f (1—e)2c0 — ).4 ].~. (b!.~-1
—
[(1 — (1—e)c)20 +
+ f (1—e)2c0 — 4 + [ (1—e)2cO~
1 (1 - (1-e) C) 20 + - (1 - (i-c) C) 20 + A,]t2.t
~1 2ceO—A~ 1 3.
1(3- - (1—e)c)20 + 4jY1,~
÷1 ( g~C )2O+4 1
(1 - (1-e)c)20 +




1(1 — (1—c) c) 20 + - - . -
2c 0-4 1
+ [(1 - (i—e)c)20 + )~4~] 1.t~
4.1 2~ O ‘~ ~
[(1 — (1—e)c)20 +
+[ 1 20 — (1-e)2c0 + A4j ~
Next note the following:9
(A29) r2





_____ — - (P2~t_i)(P
2
I~c\ = (i~_,) I CC ~P2t
=~ 1) p_,\ Ip~~~\ (P,~t_,~\ ______ ______ — b2.~_,)
- (P2~ ~
= (i~_,) I ~ (P~t_i) (Pitt_u
~Pi,t-u P,,c ) ~‘ -
= rit_, (b/~_,— b2,~_,)P~_,
Furthermore,
(A30) ~ — = b21~, p~_, — .b,2.~_, — bm t—i
(A31) J:,2’~C_1 — b2~_, = bi2t, .._L_. — b2,,~_1
— -2-b
2 ~‘
Using equations A(29) - A(3l), equations A(27) and A(28) can be rewritten as:
— I [(1 g) — (1—e)c)20 + 41
(A32) Y,~ { (1 - (i-e)c)20) +~ j~i.t




+ i (1—e)2c0 — ).4 ]b1
t + { (1—e)2c0~
[(1 - (1—e)c)20 + 4 (1 - (1—e)c)20 +
r 2ce0-4
+ [(1 - (1-e)c)20 +
I (~ — c)20+ A$ J~2.t~t
[(1 - (1-e)c)20 + 4
4-cO
1 (1-(i-e)c)20 +~]r,~, bmt..i
2c 0 - 4 + [ 2e+0
[(1 - (1-e)c)20 + 4 (1-(1-e)c)20 +
÷1____________
120 - (1-e)2CO ÷10
[(i-c) - (i—c) C] 20 + 41 (A33) Y2,c ={ (1 — (i- )c)20) +~
+[ 2c0(12 ) ]~, ~,(b 1
12t—u ~ — b21.~,) (1-(1—c) c) 20 + 4 - -
+ 1 (1-e)2c0 —~ l~ + I (1—e)2c0~ 1
1(1 — (i— )c)20+ A$j 2,t 1(1 — (i—c) c) 20 +
+J
2c 0-4
(1 - (i-e)c)20 +
+ I (g — cc)20 ÷ X4 1 i
[(1 — (1—e)c)20 +
÷1 4-cO ___
1 (1- (1-c) C) 20 + 4] ric, bm t~i
+E
2cc0—)4 1b 1
(i - (i—c) c) 20 + A4j Lt
+[ 2e~0 10 i
(1 — (1—e)c)20 +
÷1 1b 1
[20 - (1-e)2c0 + 4j tfl.t~
Substituting equation (A32) into equation (A33) yields:
2e01
+ (1—c)2c0 — b + (1—e)240 ~
(A34) Y,~ = - ~ I g,,~ AA
+ 2c O — ~ b ~ + (g - ec)20 + 4 2e~O e
A 2, A ~ A ~2,tPt
+ -4~.i, + (1—2e)2c0
A Jfl.t A z1.t.,(b2,,t..,.~t_, —
b
A 1,c—1 tiLt-i
A .~ — ~)~2~c + (1—e)2c0 — X4 b2~j5~ +E2~04l { A
+ (1—e)24~0 + 2ce0 — A4 (e —ec)20 +
AA Yi,t~ A
+ 2ccO b 2ce0 e 4~
A~ + A ~ + A
(l—2e)2c0 r, ~,(b 1
+ A - — 12.t—1~ — b21~,)
+ A4c0 r,ti~~m.t_, —
pc-i11
where:
A (1 — (i-c)c)20 +
Combining terms and solving for yit gives:
— ec)20 +
(A35) Y,.C =[(~ — ~ + (g A ) 13 ~
+[ (1—e)2CO-4 +V2l1 b
A
+ [ (1—c)2~0 + v 2e+0 1 ~.
AA
+ E v(i + (i—e)2c0 — ;.4~)]..4. b2~~
A
+ [ (Eq —cc) 20 + 4 + 1 2q O ‘~1
A vk~l_ A )j3~.cI~c
b + [ 2~ 0 + ~ (i—e)2+O ]-4~.~ + [ -~ (1 + ~~ ~
A
+ [ (1—2e)2c0 — ~ (i—2e)2cO 1 3-
AA ~ (b2, c_i •~i—i — b12
~.,)




— (2ce0 — A4)2
A2
Which can then be simplified to give:12
(A36) y,~ = - Eg ) g,,~
i-c+2ce
+ 20c(C—14-c—2c ) + 4(i—2c+4ce)
2(i—c+2ce) (CO—0-A+)
+ 2~0(c—1+e—2ce)+42(2c-i)
2(i-c+2c ) (cO—0—4) ~
÷2ccg2
~C + 4-2cc0 + i-c - 2 (i-c+2ce) (cO-0-4)
4(4-2c4-2 O) + +




+ 0—cO+A4 ~ 2 m,t-1
The solution process for Y2,t is the same as for y1~.1
APPENDIX B
SOLVING FOR EQUILIBRIUM INFLATION AND OUTPUT
This appendix uses the Aggregate Supply and Demand equations for
country 1 and country 2 to solve for the each country’s equilibrium inflation
rate and output level as given by Tables VIII and IX.
Country l’s and country 2’s aggregate supply equations are as follows:
(Bl) y~ = ÷ (3’) [‘(3 (it,~, - ~ — ‘(2
(B2) Y2t = + a (‘(i’(~’(2’(4) ‘(~ (n
2~
,—it~~~) — y~ (it,~,—it~,)]
where the coefficients:
‘(is Y~’‘(3’ ‘(4
are defined in the text.
The aggregate demand equations for country 1 and country 2 are:
(B3) y,,~= A, g1~




,t~, ~pt + A~bmt + It_i ~ — ~
(B4) Y2.c = A, g
2~~
+ A2 b2~
+ A3 it~ + A4 g,~~-4- + A5
+ A6 ic~4. + A5 b=~4_ +
1
c-i~2 — it2~,Y2 Pt P~
where the coefficients A1 to A10 are defined in Table V, and:2
= A8 (b2, ~_, ~ — b12
~ + .49~ bm c..i
Y2
= A8(b - - !— ~) + A9-~-b (.._!_) 12 C i — — ~‘21,t—i m.t—iJ ,~
PC-i “ .b~t_1)
Substituting equation (83) into (Bl) gives ir1,~.1 as a function of the
pre-determined, exogenous and policy variables, and t~:
a (‘(i’(3—’(2’(4) (A,g, ~+A2b, ~+A3it~ ~+A4g2~ ~i’~)























Likewise, substituting equation (84) into (82) gives it
2
as a function
of the pre-determined, exogenous and policy variables, and lriti:








Y2fi~a (‘(1’(3-’(2’(4) + v~7 ~
+ 7 — [ ~ + ‘(~ ~ J
Y2~~a(y,y3—’(2y4) + y,y
Substituting (86) into (85) and solving for ir1~1gives equilibrium
inflation in country 1, with all variables deflated by country l’s price
index. This is the ir,~.
1 equation in Table VII in the text. Substituting
this equation into (83) and solving for yi,t gives+ Y,Q, - a2Y~Y2j5~(y,y3—v2y4)
01








0, = a2Y,Y2j5~(y,y3-y2y4) + a7(’(,Y1+y3Y~~) + 72
Which can be simplified to arrive at the equilibrium output equation for
country 1, as given by Table VIII in the text.
3
(37) = {A,[Q, - a2Y,Y215~(y,-y3-y2y4)
0~
— Y1ay,~] — A4aY,y25] g,.c
÷IA2~ - a2Y,Y2~~(y,y3-y2y4) ~1
+ {A3[0, - a2Y,Y~~(’(,’(3-Y2’(4) ~
- Y,ay,~]
- uY,y191
— A5aY11271 b j i,t
- e
I_lvi.c
+ IA4[a’ - a2YY~5(yy-yy) 0~
+V”~’ - aY,Y2P~(y,y3y2y4)
0,









0, - a2Y,Y2fl~ey1y3-y2y4) —
- ~iY2~] ~bmt
0,
- aY~y1j7 - 1
I ~4
In order to calculate country 2’s equilibrium inflation rate, with all
the variables deflated by country 2’s consumer price index, it is necessary to
multiply both sides of equation (Bl) by (l/p):




Now, substituting (83) into (B8) to solve for it,t1 as a function of the pre-
determined, exogenous and policy variables, and W2t,, yields:
a(y,y3—y2y4) (Ai~i.t~ + A2b1~
4
+ A 0 1
3~
iti ~—~— I (B9) it,~t~i V
c P~ Pt) —~-a(v~v3-v2v4) +
Pt P~









) + Y3__~_ Pt
Pt Pt
a(y,y3-y2y4) (A~ ~ + ~b 1 ~1 -
÷ y . m t~ +





1t~,t_, + 12 ~ — ‘t~~_,) I
—~-a(y1y3—y2y4) +
Pt Pt
Likewise substituting (84) into (82) gives W2t, as a function of the pre-







+ a (YiY3~Y2Y4~ — (A4g,~_~_ + A5b,~-4- +
Y2a (‘(113-1214) + Pt Pt
Pt
+ a(y,y3—y2y4) — mtZ +‘Y21t1 —
Y2a(y1y3-y2y4) + y,_~:. ~P t P t
Pt
-~












Substituting equation (89) into (B1O) one can solve for ,r2,~..,, the












































































P4 -.4 p.) -4 -4 (4 -4 ‘9
0. I 0.
— -.4 ..- -4






























































a2Y,4.Y2(y,y3_y2y~) + a—’Y-(y,Y14-+y3Y2) +
Pt ~t Pt
Substituting equation (811) into (84) and solving for y
2
t gives8
















- U’f3Y2*1 - A2ay4Y24-
Pt Jb,t~
1













A2 [02 - a2YlkYz(’(,’(3_12’(4) - av3Y2fI - A5a’(4Y2f
02
- a2Y,-.~_Y2(’(,y3_y2’(4) - a’(3Y2f1 - A4ay4Y2-
~2











Making use of this definition of 02, equation (812) can be simplified to





















I .i~ (ay4y-4- + .~fl 1 — 2 + 1 ~ ‘~ ~ P~) I ~
I - ay1Y,4-Y2 1
I P~ I
~1.













+ .Z...J - P~) A5a’(4Y2-~- Pt I I
[ (ay y ~ .i. ~1 1fi .1~
02






A4 (ay Y ~ -1-
‘~ ‘‘~P~



















This appendix uses the inflation and output equations for country 1
(Tables VII and VIII), to derive the signs of the comparative statics given in
Tables IX and X.
Effect on Inflation of a Change in One of the Policy Variables
The denominator of each coefficient is 0,. Given that Y2, 1~, a, ~ and
are positive, the sign of the denominator depends upon the sign of the term
(1,i3 - Y274). Since ~y> 1/2 this term is positive. Therefore, the
denominator of each coefficient is positive. Determining the sign of the
coefficients on the policy variables in the inflation equation thus, becomes a
matter of determining the sign of the numerators of these coefficients.
Since (y,-y~- 72’14)>O, the signs of the numerators of the policy variable
coefficients in the equilibrium inflation equation for country 1, depend upon
the signs of the aggregate demand coefficients (A, through A7).
a) Tax financed expenditures by the government of country 1:
A,[a2Y2jS~(y,y3—y2y4) + ay,7] + A4ay2jT
Ui
Since A, > 0 and A4 > 0 the numerator is positive. Thus an increase in
own government expenditures will increase inflation in country 1.2
b) Bond financed expenditures by the government of country 1:




) > 0 but (A4 + A
5
) may be positive or negative. If (A4 + A
5
>
0, then the numerator is positive. If (A4 + A
5
) < 0 then the sign of the





c) Tax financed expenditures by the government of country 2:
A4[a2Y2P~(y,y3-y2y4) + ay,7) + A,ay27
Since Ai > 0 and A4 > 0 the numerator is positive. Thus an increase in
government expenditures by country 2 will increase inflation in country 1.
d) Bond financed expenditures by the government of country 2:
(A4+A5) [a2Y2fl~(y,y3—y2y4) + ay,jT] + (A,+A2)ay2j7
0,
(A, + A2) > 0 but, as noted above, (A4 + A
5
) may be positive or negative.
If (A
4
+ A5) > 0, then the numerator is positive. If (A4 + A5) < 0 then the
sign of the numerator is indeterminate.3
e) Bond holdings of the central bank:
A7[a2Y2P~(y,y3—’(2y4) + ay,y+ ay2yI
Ui
Given that A7 > 0 an increase in bond holdings by the central bank will
increase inflation in country 1.
Effect on Output of a Change in One of the Policy Variables
The denominator of each coefficient is 0,. As shown above, this term is
positive. Thus, determining the sign of the coefficients on the exogenous
variables in the output equation becomes a matter of determining the sign of
the numerators of these coefficients.
a) Tax financed expenditures by the government of country 1:
A~ [ay3Y2iSc7 + 72 1 - A4uY,y27
Ui
A, > 0 and A4 > 0. Given that -P’½, 73>72. If
(Cl) Y2 >
then the numerator is definitely positive. A necessary condition for the
inequality in (Cl) to hold is for country 1 to have had a larger current
account deficit last period than that of country 2. A sufficient condition is
that country 1 was a net debtor and country 2 was a net creditor last period.
If this the inequality given by (Cl) does not hold then the conditions
for the numerator to be positive can be found by rewriting the numerator as:
(C2) A,[ay3Y2fi~7+72) — A4ay2y[—Y2JS~~ + Aqbm.c..i)Table IX: Effect of Changes in Policy Variables on Output in Country i
Increase in tax financed government
expenditures by country i
Increase in bond financed government
expenditures by country i
Increase in tax financed government
expenditures by country j
Increase in bond financed government
expenditures by country j
Increase in real balances

























balances ++ +Figure 1
Effect of an Increase in Government Spending (Tax








AD AD” AD AD” AD’
y2
1Figure 2
Effect of an Increase in Government











Effect of an Increase in the Bond Holdings of the Central






























Net Creditor Effects with
Negative Demand Spillovers
(Home Country)
it
AS AS
AS’
AD
AD’
AD’
AD
y y